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LEGALIZING FAMILIES: SOLUTIONS TO ADJUDICATE PARENTAGE
FOR LESBIAN CO-PARENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Kathleen entered into a committed lesbian relationship with
Lisa, a single mother with a three-year-old daughter.' After living together
for one year, Lisa and Kathleen decided to have a child of their own.
2
Kathleen and Lisa decided that Lisa would be artificially inseminated.3
When the baby was born in 1987, he was given Kathleen's surname as his
middle name. 4 Kathleen, Lisa and their two children lived together as a
family until 1990, when their relationship dissolved.5 In 1999, a court de-
nied Kathleen continued contact with her two children. 6
When Kathleen and Lisa separated, they reached an agreement re-
garding custody of the children; the children were to live with Lisa and
visit Kathleen on alternate weekends. 7 Lisa abided by this agreement until
November 1994, when she refused to allow the children to visit Kathleen.
8
Despite Lisa's refusal to allow Kathleen to visit the children, Kathleen still
contacted them through letters and occasionally telephoned the older
child.9 In 1996, Kathleen visited the children surreptitiously on several
1. See Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 71 Cal. App. 4th 524, 526-27 (1999) (discussing
history of relationship between parties). At the time of the involvement between
Kathleen C. and Lisa W., Lisa W. had a three-year-old daughter, K.C.W. See id.
(noting that Lisa was mother to daughter at time Lisa and Kathleen entered into
relationship).
2. See id. (describing circumstances of Kathleen C. and Lisa W. before birth of
their son).
3. See id. (noting Lisa W. became pregnant through artificial insemination).
4. See id. (indicating Lisa W. and Kathleen C.'s baby was named Z.C.W.).
5. See id. (summarizing familial arrangement between parties). During their
relationship, Kathleen C. was "regularly involved in the parenting and support of
both children." Id.
6. See id. at 527 (holding that lesbian co-parent of two children was not enti-
tled to custody of children). The trial court denied Kathleen C. parental rights to
her children. See id. (noting that trial court found Kathleen C. lost status as de
facto parent and psychological parent). The trial court denied her parental rights
because she could not demonstrate that there was a detrimental effect on the chil-
dren by living with Lisa W. and not visiting Kathleen C. See id. (examining decision
of trial court). The appellate court affirmed, finding that Kathleen C. could not
be granted visitation fights of the children over the objection of their biological
parent. See id. at 528 (discussing holding of court).
7. See id. at 526 (describing visitation agreement between parties).
8. See id. (describing circumstances of termination of visitation agreement).
Lisa W. unilaterally terminated the visitation agreement she and Kathleen entered
into at the time of their separation. See id. (noting that Kathleen C. regularly vis-
ited her children prior to termination of visitation agreement).
9. See id. (stating that Kathleen C. continued to contact her children). After
Lisa W. forbade Kathleen C. to see their children, Kathleen C. continued to main-
(363)
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occasions.10 When Lisa found out about the meetings, she sought and
obtained a restraining order that forbade Kathleen from having any con-
tact with either Lisa or their children.'1 In an attempt to regain contact
with her children, Kathleen filed a petition for guardianship of the chil-
dren.12 The trial court denied Kathleen's petition even though it found
Kathleen to be the children's psychological, or de facto, parent.' 3 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision denying Kathleen cus-
tody of her children. 14 The appellate court held that a lesbian partner
who is not the natural or adoptive parent of the children is not entitled to
custody of the children when the relationship ends.
15
tain contact with her children. See id. (discussing Kathleen C.'s secretive visitation
with her children). Kathleen C. wrote both the children letters. See id. (summariz-
ing efforts Kathleen C. made to facilitate continuation of relationship). Kathleen
C. also kept in contact with the older child, K.C.W., through occasional telephone
calls. See id. (noting that Kathleen C. made occasional phone calls to her daughter
after termination of visitation agreement).
10. See id. (describing nature of Kathleen C.'s continued contact with her
children).
11. See id. (noting circumstances of restraining order). Lisa W. filed for a
restraining order against Kathleen C. under the Domestic Violence Prevention
Act. See id. (describing action for restraining order). On April 25, 1996, the trial
court issued a temporary restraining order against Kathleen C. that prevented
Kathleen C. from contacting Lisa W. or their children. See id. (discussing tempo-
rary restraining order). Following a hearing, the trial court issued Lisa W. a re-
straining order, which prohibited Kathleen C. from contacting either Lisa W. or
their children for a period of one year set to expire on July 1, 1997. See id. (detail-
ing contents of restraining order).
12. See id. (discussing legal steps Kathleen C. took to preserve her relationship
with her children). In her petition, Kathleen C. claimed that she was the de facto
parent of the children. See id. (examining Kathleen C.'s assertion that children
were being harmed by Lisa W.'s decision to cut off children's relationship with
Kathleen C.).
13. See id. at 526-27 (noting that trial court found that Kathleen C. was chil-
dren's de facto and psychological parent when she lived with Lisa W., but that
Kathleen C. lost that status after dissolution of relationship). The trial court de-
nied Kathleen's petition for guardianship because it found that the children suf-
fered no detrimental effect from remaining with Lisa W. and not visiting Kathleen
C. See id. at 527 (noting trial court's reasoning for ultimate denial of Kathleen C.'s
petition for guardianship of children).
14. See id. at 527-28 (holding that Kathleen C. was not entitled to custody or
visitation of children). In reaching its decision, the court examined case law, the
status of guardianship law in California and de facto parenthood theory. See id.
(citing various sources of authority for court's holding). After examining these
three resources, the court noted that, in order for a court to make a custody order
granting custody to a non-parent, the non-parent must establish that remaining in
the custody of the parent is detrimental to the child. See id. at 528 (stating that
"courts... have recognized de facto or psychological parent status in guardianship
and custody proceedings when there was clear and convincing evidence that the
continued custody of a child by the biological parents was detrimental to the
child").
15. See id. at 527 (finding that "a lesbian partner who is not a biological or
adoptive parent is not entitled to custody of children conceived during a same-sex
bilateral relationship").
[Vol. 49: p. 363
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Kathleen's situation regarding her children is not an isolated case of a
family being torn apart 16 by courts that refuse to allow non-legal parents
to have rights to their children. 17 There are an estimated six to ten mil-
lion same-sex parents in the United States parenting an estimated six to
fourteen million children.18 Due to the advent and widespread use of al-
16. See Kyle C. Velte, Towards Constitutional Recognition of the Lesbian-Parented
Family, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 245, 249, 256 (2000/2001) (examining
consequences of relationship dissolution on children). When co-parents are not
allowed to maintain a relationship with their children, the parent-child bond that
formed between the child and the co-parent is lost. See id. at 256 (explaining con-
sequences of courts' denying standing to lesbian co-parents). The loss of the par-
ent-child bond causes emotional and economic damage to the child and the co-
parent. See id. (same). The child also loses an entire extended family. See id. at
249 (asserting that when relationship dissolves and legal parent does not allow
children to visit with co-parent, children lose set of grandparents, aunts, uncles
and cousins).
17. See, e.g., Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 683 (Vt. 1997) (affirming deci-
sion that court did not possess power to adjudicate visitation dispute between les-
bian co-parent and her former partner). In Titchenal, Chris Titchenal and Diane
Dexter began a relationship, purchased a home together, held joint bank accounts
and eventually decided to raise a child together. See id. (stating facts). When artifi-
cial insemination failed, Diane Dexter adopted a baby girl. See id. (same). The
couple gave the child the surname Titchenal-Dexter. See id. (noting that child was
named Sarah Ruth Titchenal-Dexter). Titchenal and Dexter held themselves out
to be the parents of the child and the child called them "Mama Chris" and "Mama
Di." See id. (discussing parental situation of child after birth). When the relation-
ship dissolved, the child continued to visit with Titchenal. See id. (noting that child
stayed with Titchenal from Wednesday afternoons to Friday evenings). Within five
months, however, Dexter "severely curtailed" Titchenal's visitation with the child.
See id. (describing deviation from visitation agreement). Titchenal filed for cus-
tody of the child, claiming that she was the child's psychological or de facto parent.
See id. (noting that Titchenal wanted court to order regular, unsupervised visita-
tion with child). The trial court refused to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to
allow Titchenal to continue her relationship with the child. See id. (discussing su-
perior court's dismissal of Titchenal's complaint). The appellate court affirmed,
stating that Titchenal did not have standing to continue the suit and that the legis-
lature was better equipped to deal with the social and policy ramifications of ex-
panding the classes of persons entitled to assert parental rights. See id. at 683, 689
(describing holding); see also Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109-10 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that while co-parent may be psychological parent,
psychological parents are not entitled to visitation when it would infringe on bio-
logical parent's privacy rights); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that Tennessee law does not provide for lesbian co-parent to
petition for custody of child).
18. SeeJoHN C. MAYOUE, BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN FAMILY LAw 149
(2d ed. 2003) (reporting that there are estimated six to fourteen million children
being raised by at least one homosexual parent); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
and Other Non-traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2 (1990) (indicating that
there are no precise statistics on children of lesbian or gay parents, but that esti-
mates range from six million to eight to ten million); Lambda Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Fact Sheet, at http://www.lambdale-
gal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=31 (last modified Sept. 28, 1997)
(noting that there are estimated six to ten million lesbian and gay parents in
United States who are parents to estimated six to fourteen million children); see
3
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ternative pregnancy methods, the number of lesbian families with chil-
dren is ever-increasing.1 9 Current laws do not effectively protect non-
traditional families like Kathleen's.20 As a result, when a lesbian couple
with children dissolves, traditional rules governing child custody and visita-
tion are often inadequate and leave families in crisis.2 1
The purpose of this Note is to propose solutions to the problems that
lesbian co-parents face in solidifying their legal relationships with their
children. 22 Part II examines traditional custody standards and the non-
litigious custody options available to lesbian parents to form the families
that they desire. 23 Part III of this Note discusses custody litigation and
examines how current custody standards are ineffective in protecting the
relationships between co-parents and their children. 24 Finally, this Note
considers proposed definitional and statutory solutions that may remedy
the inadequate protection current custody schemes afford.25 This Note
concludes that, until states take legislative action, co-parents should use
second-parent adoption and pre-birth decrees, where available, to legally
also Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Couples/Partners: Census 2000; Gay and
Lesbian Families: Same-Sex Partner Households, at http://www.hrc.org/familynet/doc-
uments/L%20census.pdf (last modified Aug. 22, 2001) (stating statistics of homo-
sexuals living in United States). The Human Rights Campaign Foundation (HRC)
estimates the number of people living in same-sex households at 3,136,921,
whereas the U.S. Census 2000 estimates the number to be 1,202,418. See id. (dis-
cussing statistical discrepancies between HRC and Census estimates of homosexu-
als in United States).
19. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 464-66 (asserting that modern lesbian-
headed families do not include children born of former heterosexual relation-
ships). Many of these lesbian parents have created their families through adoption
and artificial insemination, whether through a known or unknown donor.- See id.
at 466 (discussing family-making choices available to lesbian parents).
20. See Laurie A. Rompala, Note, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests of the
Child: Why Illinois Courts Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1933, 1933 (2001) (explaining that lesbian and gay parents do not fit
traditional mold of nuclear family).
21. See id. (recognizing that because lesbian families are not like traditional
families, traditional rules governing dissolution of relationships do not "neatly en-
compass" their families).
22. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adju-
dicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Co-parents, 50 BUFF. L. REv. 341, 342 n.4
(2002) (defining co-parent). A lesbian co-parent is an individual who is not a bio-
logical or adoptive mother, but who is the "committed, lesbian partner of a child's
biological parent, who has fully participated in the decision to create a family, and
who has functioned as the parent to the child." Id. (stating definition of co-
parent).
23. For a discussion of traditional custody standards and the availability of
non-litigious custody options for lesbian parents, see infra notes 29-83 and accom-
panying text.
24. For a discussion of custody litigation and the ineffectiveness of current
custody standards, see infra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of proposed solutions that may remedy the inadequate
protection of current custody schemes, see infra notes 97-201 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 49: p. 363
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solidify their relationships with their children.2 6 Further, states should
take action to legalize co-parent families by adopting a statutory scheme
that places co-parents in parity with legal parents and allows co-parents to
adjudicate their maternity.2 7 When the legislature does not take these
statutory steps, courts should embrace a broader definition of parenthood
and give more legal weight to the parent-child relationship.
28
II. BACKGROUND
A. Non-litigious Options for Co-parents
Lesbian parents have few non-litigious options when it comes to estab-
lishing legal relationships with their non-biological children. 29 These
non-litigious options allow non-traditional families to enter the periphery
of the legal system and do not place the parents in an unwanted adver-
sarial relationship. 30 There are four main options for lesbian co-parents:
(1) second-parent adoption; 3 1 (2) co-parenting agreements; 32 (3) pre-
26. For a discussion of how second-parent adoption and pre-birth decrees
help co-parents to legally solidify relationships with their children, see infra notes
35-47, 56-60 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of how and why states should take legislative action to
legalize co-parent families, see infra notes 159-201, 204-07 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of why courts should define parenthood more broadly
and give more legal weight to the parent-child relationship, see infra notes 97-158,
208-09 and accompanying text.
29. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Custody and Visitation, How to
Safeguard Your Relationship with Your Child, at http://www.hrc.org/familynet/chap-
ter.asp?article=371 (last visited Oct. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Custody and Visitation]
(denoting family resources for lesbians). Lesbians can use second-parent adop-
tions and co-parenting agreements to solidify their legal relationships with their
children. See id. (surveying legal methods lesbian parents use to form legally recog-
nized relationships with their non-biological children); see also Ruthann Robson,
Making Mothers: Lesbian Legal Theory & the Judicial Construction of Lesbian Mothers, 22
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15, 19 (2000) (discussing pre-birth decrees); Rompala, supra
note 20, at 1946-47 (explaining co-parenting agreements). When a legal parent
terminates visitation between the child and the co-parent, if the co-parent and the
legal parent cannot work out an acceptable visitation arrangement, the co-parent
is forced to use litigation to maintain a relationship with the child. See id. at 1947-
48 (detailing relationship dissolution and options for co-parents).
30. For a discussion of non-litigious options for legalizing relationships with
children and why co-parents wish to remain outside the court system, see infra
notes 31-70 and accompanying text.
31. See Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32
U. MEM. L. REv. 643, 659 (2002) (defining second-parent adoption). Second-par-
ent adoption "occurs when the committed partner of the biological parent of a
child intends to co-parent the child with the partner" and then the committed
partner adopts the child without disturbing the biological parent's rights. See id.
(describing second-parent adoption). For further discussion of second-parent
adoption, see infra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
32. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1946 (defining co-parenting agreement).
Lesbian couples often draft parenting agreements that "detail[ ] each party's ex-
pectations and promises in the contract." Id. (acknowledging practicalities of co-
parenting agreement); see also Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Legal Docu-
2004] NOTrE
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birth decrees;3 3 and (4) visitation agreements subsequent to the dissolu-
tion of the relationship.3
4
1. Second-Parent Adoption
Second-parent adoptions are the best way for lesbian co-parents to
solidify their legal relationships with their children.3 5 A party may only
adopt a child when the child's legal relationship with the child's biological
parent is terminated.3 6 The requirement of termination of parental rights
effectively stops co-parents from forming a legal bond with their child.
3 7
In order to have the legal family for which they planned and desired, some
lesbian parents terminate their parental rights to their biological children
and then become their child's adoptive parent along with their partner.
38
This choice of relinquishment and adoption has financial and psychologi-
cal pitfalls.3 9 Two-parent adoption may be more expensive than an adop-
tion by one person, and the biological parent may feel emotional
discomfort in having to abdicate biologically vested rights to the child.
40
ments: Sample Co-parenting Agreement, at http://www.hrc.org/familynet/documents/
4c75a103.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (providing sample co-parenting agree-
ment). The sample co-parenting agreement states that it is the intention of the
parties to 'jointly and equally share parental responsibility" including providing
food, clothing and shelter and making education and medical decisions. Id. (list-
ing responsibilities of co-parents). For a further discussion of co-parenting agree-
ments, see infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
33. See Carol Ness, Lesbian Rights Crusaders: Pioneering S.F. Group Still in Fore-
front of Gay Families' Fight for Legitimacy, S.F. EXAMINER, June 25, 2000, at B-I
(describing pre-birth decrees as "state-of-the-art" strategy for co-parent to be de-
clared child's legal parent).
34. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1947-48 (discussing visitation agreements
between co-parents). When a lesbian relationship that involves children dissolves,
often the co-parents informally agree to a visitation or custody schedule. See id. at
1947 (describing visitation agreements). For a further discussion of visitation
agreements subsequent to the dissolution of a relationship, see infra notes 61-66.
35. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1945 (stating that second-parent adoption
is best solution for same-sex families). Second-parent adoptions allow co-parents
to protect their legal rights to their children. See id. (discussing second-parent
adoption as best way for individuals to solidify legal relationships with children to
whom they are not otherwise legally related).
36. See Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (explaining second-parent adoption).
37. See Jacobs, supra note 22, at 345 (describing second-parent adoption).
Lesbian co-parents have no legal mechanism by which they can establish legal
parenthood with respect to a non-biological child in states that do not recognize
second-parent adoption. See id. (asserting second-parent adoption as only way to
receive legally recognized relationship with child).
38. See Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (reporting that lesbian parents have chosen
joint adoption to solidify their partner's legal relationship with their child). In
joint adoption, the biological parent adopts the child by first relinquishing rights
as the biological parent and then obtaining rights as the adoptive parent along
with the partner. See id. (discussing joint adoption process).
39. See id. (stating disadvantages ofjoint adoption).
40. See id. (discussing disadvantages of joint adoption). In a joint adoption,
the biological parent adopts the parent's own child. See id. (describing joint adop-
tion process). A child cannot, however, be adopted when the child has an appro-
[Vol. 49: p. 363
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Current statutory schemes in some states, however, no longer force lesbian
parents to take such drastic steps.41 Rather, these states are allowing les-
bian parents to use second-parent adoption to form the legal bonds that
they desire.4
2
In second-parent adoption, a third party adopts the child, but does
not disturb the rights of the biological parent.4 3 Once the adoption is
complete, the adoptive parent stands in parity with the biological parent
and has all the rights and responsibilities that flow from legal
parenthood. 44 Currently, seven states allow lesbian co-parents to adopt
the biological or adoptive children of their partners. 45 In sixteen other
states, the legality of co-parent adoption is questionable, as it has only
been granted at the trial court level and has not been specifically approved
at the appellate level or by the legislature.46 One state specifically bars
lesbians and gay men from adopting children. 4
7
priate biological parent. See id. (examining legal limitation of adoption). Thus,
the biological parent must relinquish parental rights before commencing the joint
adoption. See id. (explaining procedural process of joint adoption).
41. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Second-Parent Adoption, at http:/
/www.hrc.org/familynet/chapter.asp?article=209 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (rec-
ognizing that in seven states and District of Columbia, second-parent adoption has
been approved by either appellate court rulings or statute). The states that allow
second-parent adoption are California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania and Vermont. See id. (listing states that allow second-par-
ent adoption).
42. See id. (discussing second-parent adoption). Second-parent adoption al-
lows a child to have two legal parents: a biological parent and an adoptive parent.
See id. (presenting second-parent adoption as best way to secure non-biological
parents' legal rights).
43. See Gary, supra note 31, at 659 (defining second-parent adoption);
Rompala, supra note 20, at 1945 (noting that biological parent must consent to
adoption but is not required to relinquish rights).
44. See Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (discussing legal consequences of second-
parent adoption). Once an adoption is complete, both the biological and the
adoptive parents are "legal parents for purposes of intestacy as well as for other
purposes." Id. (explaining advantages of second-parent adoptions).
45. For a further discussion of the seven states that approve of second parent
adoption, see supra note 41.
46. Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (indicating that in sixteen states, second-par-
ent adoptions have been specifically granted at trial court level or there is anecdo-
tal evidence of second-parent adoptions being granted). The sixteen states that
have approved second-parent adoption at the trial court level or through anecdo-
tal evidence are Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas
and Washington. See id. (listing states that are receptive to second-parent
adoption).
47. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2003) ("No person ... may adopt if
that person is a homosexual.").
2004] NOTE
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2. Co-parenting Agreements
Co-parenting agreements are legal documents that a lesbian couple
uses to explain the rights and responsibilities of each co-parent. 48 Co-
parenting agreements do not offer lesbian co-parents the legal surety of
second-parent adoptions because the enforceability of co-parenting agree-
ments is questionable. 4 9 Courts often refuse to give effect to co-parenting
48. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1946 (explaining that co-parenting agree-
ments set forth "expectations and promises of each involved adult").
49. See In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing
enforceability of co-parenting agreement). In In re Thompson, Debbie Coke and
Mary Helen Looper were involved in a lesbian relationship. See id. (describing
history of relationship between parties). They decided that they wanted to have a
child, and J.C. was born as a result of artificial insemination of Coke by a known
donor. See id. (acknowledging that Donald Dooley is biological father ofJ.C.). On
April 30, 1993, Coke and Looper entered into a formal co-parenting agreement.
See id. (detailing co-parenting agreement). The co-parenting agreement con-
tained several clauses, with one pertaining to the custodial arrangement after the
dissolution of their relationship:
7. Each party acknowledges and agrees that if Debbie Lynn Coke and
Mary Helen Looper are no longer living together in the family home they
will both continue to provide for [the child] in the manner described
below:
a. Legal custody of the child would remain with the biological parent,
Debbie Lynn Coke;
b. Mary Helen Looper would have reasonable visitation;
c. Mary Helen Looper would have no financial obligations to [the child].
Id. When the relationship dissolved, the custody arrangement described in the co-
parenting agreement went into effect. See id. (discussing situation subsequent to
dissolution of their relationship). Eventually, Coke no longer wanted to abide by
the visitation agreement. See id. (finding that Coke refused to continue to honor
visitation agreement). Coke and Dooley filed a "Complaint for Permanent Re-
straining Order and for Damages" against Looper. See id. (detailing legal issues
between parties). Looper counterclaimed, demanding damages on breach of con-
tract and tort claims. See id. (discussing counterclaim brought by Looper against
Coke and Dooley). The trial court denied Looper's plea for custody and visitation
of her child and entered a final judgment without addressing the contract claims.
See id. at 917 (holding of trial court). The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision and noted that it found it "unnecessary to express any opinion" about the
enforceability of the co-parenting agreement because the parties did not raise it on
appeal. Id. at n.4 (discussing findings of appellate court).
In a similar case,JA.L. v. E.P.H.,J.A.L. and E.P.H. entered into a lesbian rela-
tionship in 1980, began living together in 1982 and purchased a home together in
1988. See 682 A.2d 1314, 1316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (describing relationship be-
tween parties). After several years, the couple agreed that E.P.H. would be artifi-
cially inseminated. See id. (discussing process parties took to form family). J.A.L.
and E.P.H. selected a sperm donor together and began the process of artificial
insemination. See id. (explaining thatJ.A.L. performed artificial insemination on
E.P.H. several times per month and that E.P.H. suffered one miscarriage). After
E.P.H. was impregnated, she andJ.A.L. consulted an attorney regarding the legal
status of their child. See id. (describing consultation with attorney). The attorney
prepared several documents for the couple, including a co-parenting agreement.
See id. at 1316-17 (discussing documents prepared by attorney). The court de-
scribed the co-parenting agreement as:
[Slet[ting] forth the parties' intention to raise the child together, to
share the financial responsibility for the child, to make decisions about
8
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agreements on the ground that biological parents cannot contract away
their constitutional rights to their children. 5 °' Despite questionable en-
forceability, 5 1 co-parenting agreements may be the best option for lesbian
couples with children.5 2 Co-parenting agreements are much less expen-
sive and less complicated than second-parent adoptions. 53 They offer les-
bian couples the option of maintaining their privacy by keeping the
couple out of the courtroom. 54 By not enforcing these co-parenting
agreements, courts ignore the reality of planned families by lesbian part-
ners and take away a viable option for continued familial stability for the
children .55
3. Pre-birth Decrees
Lesbian co-parents can use pre-birth decrees to adjudicate
parenthood from conception. 5 6 Recently ordered in California, 5 7 these
the child jointly, and for J.A.L. to become the de facto parent of the
child .. . [and] that in the event of the parties' separation, they would
share custody, continuing to make major decisions about the child jointly
and splitting the financial responsibility for the child's support.
Id. at 1317. J.A.L. and E.P.H. never executed the co-parenting agreement because
they were advised by their attorney that it was unenforceable in Pennsylvania. See
id. (noting choice of J.A.L. and E.P.H. not to execute co-parenting agreement).
50. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1946-47 ("Courts refusing to extend equita-
ble parental rights to non-biological parents reason that a biological parent cannot
contract away his or her constitutional rights.").
51. See id. at 1946 (stating that "courts may or may not enforce [co-parenting]
agreements").
52. Cf Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (noting that adoption may be very expen-
sive); Velte, supra note 16, at 249 (asserting that non-legal parents often avoid the
legal system).
53. Cf Gary, supra note 31, at 660 (noting that adoption may be very
expensive).
54. Cf Velte, supra note 16, at 249 (discussing non-legal parents' avoidance of
legal system). Some non-legal parents are "wary of facing homophobic and heter-
osexist courts." Id. (commenting on downfalls of entering legal system).
55. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1947 (asserting that by refusing to enforce
co-parent agreements, courts reject reality of planned parenthood in homosexual
relationships).
56. See id. (discussing pre-birth decrees); Human Rights Campaign Founda-
tion, In Vitro Fertilization & Legal Parenthood, at http://www.hrc.org/familynet/
1chapter.asp?artcle=271 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (describing pre-birth decrees).
In a pre-birth decree action, courts have concluded that children have two legal
mothers. See id. (examining situation in which one woman donates egg to her
lesbian partner). "[T]he birth mother is a legal parent because she gestated and
gave birth to the child, and the woman who donated the ovum is a legal parent
because she is the child's genetic parent." Id.
57. See Carol Ness, Lesbian Moms Gain Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, May 2, 1999, at A-
1 (reporting on first court to grant pre-birth decree). Linda McAllister and Leslee
Subak, a lesbian couple, spent four years trying to conceive a child. See id. (describ-
ing couples' relationship). They both underwent in vitro fertilization, but in the
end it was an embryo from McAllister's fertilized egg that was implanted in Subak's
womb. See id. (noting that very few lesbian couples have used this "egg-womb
swap" method of impregnation). McAllister and Subak were granted a pre-birth
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decrees allow co-parents to file documents with the court that name the
co-parents as the legal parents of the unborn child.58 Pre-birth decrees
allow co-parents to solidify their relationships with their unborn children
because they allow parents to avoid the scrutiny and cost of adoption. 59
Yet, the utility of pre-birth decrees is severely limited because pre-birth
decrees only assist parents of unborn children. 60
4. Visitation Agreements
Lesbian couples sometimes prepare a visitation agreement after their
relationship dissolves. 6 1 This agreement can be formal or informal. 62 As
with co-parenting agreements, the enforceability of these agreements is
questionable; 63 courts are reluctant to allow parties to contract for child
custody.6 4 Some courts, however, have used visitation agreements as evi-
dence that the biological parent agreed to a formation and continuation
of the relationship between the co-parent and the child. 65 In this respect,
decree by a San Francisco Superior Court judge, who decreed that both McAllister
and Subak were legal mothers of the child Subak was carrying. See id. (explaining
court's ruling went beyond biology and considered intent to create child to-
gether). McAllister and Subak's son, Maximillian Ehlert McAllister, was born on
March 20, 1999. See id. (discussing birth of McAllister and Subak's child). Because
of the pre-birth decree granted to McAllister and Subak, Max already had two legal
mothers. See id. (detailing implications of pre-birth decree); E.J. Graff, Equal
Rights: When Heather's Mommies Share Custody, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1999, at E-1
(examining McCallister/Subak grant of pre-birth decree); Paul O'Donnell et al.,
Why Max Has Two Mommies, NEWSWEEK, May 17, 1999, at 6 (noting that grant of
pre-birth decree naming both McAllister and Subak as legal mothers of Max was
first for homosexual couples). Although this option of pre-birth decree is new to
homosexual couples, it has been widely available to heterosexuals, including those
who use donated sperm. See id. (discussing pre-birth decree and its effects).
58. See Ness, supra note 57, at A-i (describing pre-birth decrees generally and
McAllister/Subak case specifically).
59. See id. (noting that pre-birth decree actions are substantially cheaper than
second-parent adoptions because they do not require home study). In San Fran-
cisco, a second-parent adoption can cost from $2,500 to $3,000, whereas parentage
actions cost approximately $1,500. See id. (reporting costs of pre-birth decrees and
second-parent adoptions).
60. See id. (acknowledging that pre-birth decrees must be petitioned for
before birth of child and, thus, pre-birth decrees can only facilitate legal relation-
ships between co-parents and their unbom children).
61. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 194748 (recognizing that when relation-
ship dissolves, co-parents often informally agree to custody arrangement).
62. See id. (stating that co-parents often informally agree to visitation
schedule).
63. See id. at 1946 (noting that courts may not enforce agreements between
co-parents).
64. See id. (discussing that courts often refuse to extend custody rights to chil-
dren when co-parents have made prior agreement because, as courts reason, par-
ents cannot contract away their constitutional rights).
65. See Robson, supra note 29, at 22 (asserting that courts view agreements
between co-parents as evidence that legal parent agreed to co-parent having "par-
ent-like" role). While there may be a remedy in contract for co-parents who enter
a child custody agreement with the biological parent, courts, and society in gen-
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visitation agreements, which are inexpensive, can successfully continue the
bond between a co-parent and the children so long as the legal parent
honors them.
66
These legal and extra-legal options are often unavailable or undesir-
able to lesbian co-parents. 67 Some scholars and gay and lesbian advocacy
organizations have suggested methods for keeping lesbian parents out of
the legal system. 68 If the relationship dissolves, and the legal parent of the
eral, disapprove of children being the subject of contracts. See id. (discussing lim-
ited value of contractual remedy for settling custody disputes). Although courts
may not grant the co-parent relief under a contract theory, they often view the
agreements as evidence of a "parent-like" relationship agreed to by the legal par-
ent. See id. at 22-23 (describing weight courts give to agreements between co-
parents).
66. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1947-48 (discussing dissolution of relation-
ships). When a relationship dissolves and the couple makes a visitation agreement,
it is most often the legal parent that eventually unilaterally breaks that agreement.
See id. ("If the arrangement becomes burdensome to the biological mother, she
terminates visitation.").
67. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 526 (indicating reluctance of lesbian couples
to pursue custody options through legal system). Lesbian couples, although they
may want to solidify their relationships with their children, may be reluctant to
enter the legal system because of societal bias against homosexuals. See id. (noting
that homophobia deters lesbians from entering legal system). Further, while a
couple may prefer to have its legal status settled, "the intact family's life is not
profoundly affected by the parties' legal status." Id. (arguing that lesbian-headed
families are not affected by their status as non-legal family). Legal authority is not
required for the "use of a hyphenated surname, the designation of both parents as
'Mommy,' the assumption of psychological parenthood, and the integration of the
child into the extended family of both mothers." Id. (noting that there are many
family-like actions that do not require legal recognition of family).
68. See Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Protecting Families: Standards for
Child Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, at http://www.glad.org/Publications/
CivilRightProject/protectingfamilies.pdf (last modified 1999) (detailing principles
that can be used to keep lesbian parents out of legal system). Some principles are
(1) be honest about existing relationships regardless of legal labels; (2) consider
the dispute from the perspectives of the child or children; (3) try to reach a volun-
tary resolution; (4) try to maintain continuity for the child; (5) remember that
breaking up is hard to do; (6) seriously investigate allegations of abuse in deter-
mining what is best for the child; (7) honor your agreements; (8) the absence of
legal documents is not determinative of the issues; (9) treat litigation as a last re-
sort; and (10) treat homophobic law and sentiments as off limits. See id. (noting
ways that co-parents can respect each other and their families when resolving their
differences); see also E. Gary Spitko, Reclaiming the "Creatures of the State": Contracting
for Child Custody Decisionmaking in the Best Interests of the Family, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1139, 1142-50 (2000) (explaining utility of arbitration in child custody dis-
putes). Current laws can be dysfunctional for people whose "core religious, politi-
cal, or social values and beliefs" differ from those of the majority. Id. at 1142 n.10
(discussing inadequacies of current laws in some custody disputes). Arbitration
provides a "safe-harbor" for these people by allowing the parties to choose a deci-
sion-maker who understands and accepts their values and beliefs. See id. (describ-
ing arbitration as advantageous because it allows parties to avoid laws that do not
serve them well). When planned lesbian families dissolve, the women may find
themselves in a legal system that is unable to meet their needs. See id. at 1146, 1150
(asserting that arbitration will be able to help lesbian couples to work around cur-
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children refuses to allow the co-parent to have contact with the children,
the co-parent may have to turn to litigation to keep the relationship with
the children intact. 69 Yet, courts may not be willing to recognize co-par-
ents' relationships with their children. 70
B. Traditional Approach to Custody Disputes
In general, there are three different aspects of child custody: physical
custody, legal custody and visitation. 7 1 Physical custody of the child is
where the child lives.72 Legal custody is the right to make decisions about
the child's medical care, education, religion and well-being. 73 Visitation is
the right to see and maintain a relationship with the child.7 4 Tradition-
ally, in custody disputes, courts have defined "parent" as a person who is
legally related to the child through biology or adoption. 75 If the party
rent laws that deny both co-parents equal opportunity to establish custody and
visitation rights).
69. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1947-48 (examining legal recourse of co-
parents). When a legal parent cuts the co-parent off from visiting their child, the
co-parent may have no option but to pursue a custody arrangement through the
courts. See id. at 1948 (arguing necessity of turning to litigation when biological
parent unilaterally terminates visitation of co-parent with child).
70. See Spitko, supra note 68, at 114547 (noting that laws do not recognize
that child has two mothers). Under the current legal scheme, where a child cannot
be biologically related to two mothers, and the two mothers are not allowed to
marry, only one of the co-parents can be the child's legal parent. See id. (discuss-
ing inability of courts to recognize co-parent's relationship with child); see generally
Rompala, supra note 20, at 1947 (noting that courts do not enforce agreements
between co-parents). When courts do not give effect to agreements between the
co-parents regarding child custody, they reject the families that the co-parents
planned together. See id. (asserting that courts ignore reality of "planned
parenthood" in lesbian relationships).
71. For a discussion of physical custody, see infra note 72 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of legal custody, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of visitation rights, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
72. See Velte, supra note 16, at 254 (explaining that physical possession deter-
mines physical custody).
73. See HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND GAY COUPLES 3-
4 (1996) (discussing legal parenthood). A legal parent is one who has the right to
make decisions about the child's health, education and well-being and has the
responsibility of financially supporting the child. See id. (defining rights and re-
sponsibilities of legal parenthood); Jacobs, supra note 22, at 341 (describing legal
parenthood). Legal parenthood allows the parent to make important medical, ed-
ucational and religious decisions for the child. See id. (indicating rights and re-
sponsibilities of legal parenthood).
74. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1950 (recognizing distinction between le-
gal custody and visitation).
75. See Robson, supra note 29, at 20 (discussing history of parental defini-
tions). The definition of parenthood has its roots in common law. See id. (indicat-
ing common law definition of parenthood is based on relationship of biological
mother to putative father, usually man married to mother); see alsoJacobs, supra
note 22, at 344 (noting that legal parenthood is determined by biology and
adoption).
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seeking custody of the child is not the "parent" of the child, then the party
is a third party or "legal stranger" to the child.
76
Third parties are less often afforded standing to contest custody rights
than legal parents because of constitutional privacy concerns. 77 Tradi-
tional examples of third parties include grandparents,
78 step-parents79
and siblings. 80 In the last fifteen years, lesbian co-parents have entered
custody disputes as third parties. 8 1 A third party can gain custody rights to
a child, but the third party must show that it is detrimental to the child to
remain in the custody of the biological or adoptive parent. 82 Courts in
76. See Velte, supra note 16, at 256 (arguing co-parents have status of legal
stranger). When second-parent adoption or some other legal mechanism to solid-
ify the legal bond between the co-parent and the child is unavailable, co-parents
become legal strangers to the children that they helped bring into the world and
raise. See id. (acknowledging that co-parents lack all of rights and responsibilities
of parenthood, including right to make medical, legal and educational decisions
for child).
77. See MAYOUE, supra note 18, at 212 (comparing biological parents who en-
joy constitutional rights to custody, and third parties who must rely on state stat-
utes to obtain custody rights).
78. See A JUDGE'S GUIDE: MAKING CHILD-CENTERED DECISIONS IN CUSTODY
CASES 109 (Diane Boyd Rauber ed., 2001) [hereinafter AJUDGE'S GUIDE] (discuss-
ing grandparent visitation). Grandparents have the most protected rights to visit
with their grandchildren. See id. (recognizing that every state has statutes regard-
ing grandparent custody rights). These statutes generally require the grandparent
to show that it is in the child's best interest to visit the grandparent. See id. (noting
that grandparents are required to go through best interest analysis). Grandpar-
ents may also have to show that the grandparent has established a significant rela-
tionship with the child. See id. (detailing other limitations on grandparent custody
rights). Further, courts may not grant custody to grandparents if the court finds
that visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship. See id. (explain-
ing that grandparent visitation depends on its interference with child's relation-
ship to legal parents).
79. See id. (discussing rights of step-parents to petition for visitation with
child). Many states have statutes that allow step-parents to petition for visitation of
their step-children. See id. (acknowledging statutes that allow step-parents to have
right to petition for visitation). While step-parents are generally treated like grand-
parents in the custody determination, step-parents have additional limitations on
their ability to petition for custody. See id. (noting that step-parents must often
show that they have legitimate interest in child). Further, there are often require-
ments that a step-parent contribute to the financial support of the child and that
the step-parent must give the legal parent notice before visiting the child. See id.
(discussing further limitations on step-parents' custody petitions). But see MARY
ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE,
AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 120 (1999) (asserting that after termination of
marriage between step-parent and legal parent, step-parent usually has no right to
custody or even visitation).
80. See AJUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 78, at 109 (recognizing that siblings often
have right to petition for visitation).
81. See Velte, supra note 16, at 248 (reasoning that since 1990s, increased
number of same-sex families has led to increased number of same-sex family disso-
lutions in court system).
82. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Who Gets the Children? Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville: The Impact of Troxel v. Granville on Lesbian and Gay Parents, 32 RUTGERS
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many states have abandoned this traditional analysis and have allowed co-
parents to petition for custody under a variety of theories.8 3
III. BIFURCATED ANALYSIS
In any custody dispute involving a co-parent, the court uses a bifur-
cated analysis to determine if the co-parent is entitled to visitation with the
child. 84 The first part of the two-part analysis is to determine standing,8 '5
and the second part is to determine the best interest of the child.8 6 Stand-
ing is the threshold issue for lesbian co-parents involved in a custody dis-
pute and is sometimes difficult to overcome.8 7 Without standing to
petition for custody, lesbian co-parents have "no legal recourse to main-
tain relationships with their children."8 8
Courts have consistently denied standing to lesbian co-parents be-
cause it was not statutorily granted to the co-parent.89 Many of those
courts have stated that it is the function of the legislature to provide stand-
L.J. 825, 829 (2001) (finding that third parties must prove parental unfitness
before they can petition for custody).
83. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Child Custody and Visitation Rights
Arisingfrom Same-Sex Relationship, 80 A.L.R. 5th 1, 6-11 (2003) (discussing co-parent
visitation with child). Courts have granted standing to co-parents to petition for
visitation of their children under equitable theories, de facto/psychological parent
doctrine and in loco parentis doctrine. See id. (examining theories under which
courts have granted standing to co-parents to pursue custody awards).
84. SeeJ.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (Fam. Ct. 2000) (using bifurcated
analysis in custody determination). Courts first analyze whether the co-parent has
standing to maintain a custody action. See id. (finding standing as first part of
bifurcated analysis). Following that analysis, the court determines what is in the
best interest of the child. See id. (listing best interest as second part of bifurcated
analysis).
85. See id. (requiring co-parent to establish standing). To establish standing,
the co-parent must show that the parent has an "actual and substantial" parent-
child relationship under the Holtzmann/VC. test. See id. (discussing standing for
co-parents). For a further discussion of the Holtzmann/VC. test, see infra notes
108-09.
86. See id. (requiring court to assess best interest of child). To determine
whether the co-parent is entitled to visitation with the child, the court must deter-
mine if visitation is in the best interest of the child. See id. (discussing best-interest
analysis).
87. See Rompala, supra note 20, at 1934 (noting that before co-parent may
seek custody of child, co-parent must have standing or legally cognizable interest).
A court will only address the merits of a co-parent's petition once the requirement
of standing is satisfied. See id. (recognizing standing requirements to maintain
court action).
88. Id. (discussing standing of lesbian co-parents). When co-parents are
treated as third parties, or legal strangers, to their children, they do not have stand-
ing to seek custody or visitation of their children. See id. (considering implications
of no-standing determination).
89. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) (finding co-parents gener-
ally only have standing when authorized by legislature).
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ing to a person petitioning for custody rights.90 Some jurisdictions have
solved the problem of co-parent standing by using a variety of legal theo-
ries to allow co-parents to gain standing and petition for custody of their
children. 91 Although the growing majority of courts allow lesbian co-par-
ents to petition for custody of their children, 92 lesbian co-parents are usu-
ally only awarded visitation with the children. 9 3
In general, scholars agree that children should be afforded the op-
portunity to have their co-parents recognized as their legal parents.9 4 Nev-
ertheless, some disagree about how this goal of legal relationships between
children and lesbian co-parents should be facilitated.9 5 One can divide
the proposed solutions into two categories: definitional and statutory.96
90. See, e.g., West v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. App. 4th 302, 306 (1999) ("[T]he
Legislature is the appropriate forum for expansion of the law, if such expansion is
warranted."). If standing is not provided to a co-parent, the court must presume
that the legislature is acting, or refusing to act, on the will of the people. See id. at
309 (upholding legislature's position representing will of people).
91. See Miller, supra note 83, at 6-11 (finding that courts have granted stand-
ing to co-parents to petition for visitation of their children under equitable theo-
ries, de facto/psychological parent doctrine and in loco parentis doctrine).
92. See Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Laws and Trends in the Context of the
ALl Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 5, 46-47
(2002) (determining trend towards permitting lesbian co-parent visitation and cus-
tody rights).
93. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 894 (Mass. 1999) (finding co-
parent entitled to visitation with child); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J.
2000) (holding co-parent is entitled to visitation but not physical or legal custody);
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 920 (Pa. 2001) (ruling co-parent has standing to seek
visitation with child); Holtzmann v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 438 (Wis. 1995) (con-
cluding co-parent not entitled to petition for custody, but could petition for visita-
tion provided that she established parent-like relationship).
94. SeeJacobs, supra note 22, at 350-51 (arguing that children born of lesbian
households should have two legal parents). Legal parenthood confers many bene-
fits on children, and many rights and responsibilities on parents. See id. at 347
(citing important qualities that legal parenthood visits on children and parents).
Through their legal parents, children are entitled to support and maintenance,
are eligible for Social Security benefits, may sustain wrongful death actions, may
recover under worker's compensation laws and may inherit from their parents. See
id. at 346-47 (detailing legal rights to which children are entitled through their
legal parents). Further, legal parenthood allows the parent to make educational,
medical and religious decisions for the child. See id. at 347 (illustrating decisions
legal parents can make for their children). Also, the child benefits from the emo-
tional bond shared with the co-parent. See id. (asserting that legal parenthood
confers more than monetary benefits on children).
95. Compare id. at 343 (advocating use of UPA statutory scheme), with Polikoff,
supra note 18, at 464 (promoting use of broader definitional scheme).
96. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 22, at 343 (asserting that UPA should be used
to resolve issues of lesbian co-parents' legal status); Polikoff, supra note 18, at 471
(arguing need to redefine parenthood recognizing changing social responsibilities
of families).
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A. Definitional Solutions
Definitional solutions to the problems created by current child cus-
tody law focus on courts and legislatures re-defining "family" and "parent"
to better fit the needs of lesbian co-parents and their children. 9 7 The
traditional definitional approach, known as the "formalist" approach, has
historically dominated custody law. 98 Under the formalist approach, "par-
ent" is defined by the traditional legal understanding of either biology or
adoption. 99 Functionalists reject this rigid approach to the understanding
of a "parent" and instead advocate expanding the definition of
parenthood to include parent-like relationships. 10 0 Psychological/de
facto parenthood' 01 and in loco parentis10 2 utilize a "functional," fact-based
definition of family to grant co-parents the standing necessary to reach the
best interest analysis.
10 3
1. Psychological Parent/De Facto Parent
A psychological, or de facto, parent is one who is the child's parent by
virtue of a parent-like, caretaking role in relation to the child.' 0 4 To de-
termine psychological parenthood, courts use fact-based tests.' 0 5 The
97. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 471, 473 ("By redefining parenthood and
conferring all parental rights and responsibilities on those who meet the definition
and none on those who do not, courts would take a more desirable approach.").
98. See Robson, supra note 29, at 24-25 (presenting formalist approach).
99. See id. at 25 (defining parent in formalist sense).
100. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 471 (urging that parenthood should derive
from status, that is, proof of parent-child relationship).
101. See V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 550 (N.J. 2000) (finding that psychologi-
cal parent is one who shares daily life with child, loves child and provides for
child). For a further discussion of psychological parenthood, see infra notes 104-
26 and accompanying text.
102. SeeT.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) ("'[ln locoparentis' refers
to a person who puts oneself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the for-
mality of legal adoption.").
103. See Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Parenting; Custody and Visita-
tion: The "Best Interests Principle", at http://www.hrc.org/familynet/chapter.asp?arti-
cle=370 (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (examining best interest of child analysis).
104. See V.C., 748 A.2d at 550 n.6 (finding psychological parent is one who
shares daily life with child, loves child and provides for child).
105. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (defining de
facto parent). A de facto parent is:
[O]ne who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in
the child's life as a member of the child's family. The de facto parent
resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the
legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as
the legal parent .... The de facto parent shapes the child's daily routine,
addresses his developmental needs, disciplines the child, provides for his
education and medical care, and serves as a moral guide.
Id. A de facto parent does not include an individual such as a babysitter or other
paid caretaker. See id. (requiring de facto parents to fulfill role for reasons other
than financial compensation). Although these individuals may grow to have an
affectionate relationship with the child, their caretaking responsibilities arose for
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most thoughtful and complete test was enunciated by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Holtzmann v. Knott' 1 6 and was further refined by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in V.C. v.M.J.B.
1 7
The Holtzmann/V C. test involves a four-part determination of a "par-
ent-like" relationship between the co-parent and her child.' 0 8 Under the
Holtzmann/V C. test, a court will consider a lesbian co-parent a "parent" for
the purposes of custody proceedings if she satisfies four elements:
(1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered,
the [co-parent]'s relationship with the child;
(2) the [co-parent] and the child lived together in the same
household;
(3) the [co-parent] assumed the obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education
and development, including contributing towards the child's
support, without expectation of financial compensation ... ; and
(4) the [co-parent] has been in a parental role for a length of
time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, de-
pendent relationship parental in nature. 10 9
In V.C., the New Jersey Supreme Court used the four-part "parent"
test to determine that V.C. was, in fact, the psychological parent of her
children. 1 10 In 1993, V.C. and M.J.B. entered into a lesbian relation-
financial reasons. See id. (declaring that persons who accept money for care of
child cannot be de facto parents);J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295, 299 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
2000) (announcing test for de facto/psychological parenthood).
106. 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (holding that if lesbian co-parent estab-
lished that she had parent-like relationship with child and significant triggering
event occurred, co-parent was entitled to have custody of child determined under
best interest analysis). To establish a parent-like relationship with a child, the co-
parent must prove four elements. See id. (listing what co-parent must show to es-
tablish parent-like relationship with child). Further, the co-parent must show that
a "significant triggering event justifying state intervention in the child's relation-
ship with a biological or adoptive parent" occurred. Id. (explaining that triggering
event occurs when legal parent interferes with co-parent and child's relationship).
Once the co-parent proves these elements, a "court may consider whether visita-
tion is in the best interest of the child." Id.
107. 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (discussing test for de facto parenthood).
The court in V.C. noted that the "most thoughtful and inclusive definition of de
facto parenthood [wa]s the test enunciated" in Holtzmann because it addresses the
main fears and concerns that legislatures have advanced when addressing psycho-
logical parenthood. Id.
108. See id. (describing test for de facto or psychological parenthood).
109. Id. (list format added).
110. See id. at 555 (finding that V.C. meets four-part parent-like relationship
test for psychological parenthood). The court noted that:
M.J.B. fostered and cultivated, in every way, the development of a parent-
child bond between V.C. and the twins; that they all lived together in the
same household as a family; that... V.C. assumed many of the day-to-day
obligations of parenthood toward the twins, including financial support;
and that a bonded relationship developed between V.C. and the twins
20041 NOTE 379
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ship.'1 1 That same year, M.J.B. began to see a fertility specialist regarding
becoming a parent through artificial insemination.1 2 M.J.B. became
pregnant with twins in 1994.113 In preparation for the birth of the twins,
V.C. and M.J.B. moved into a larger apartment, attended Lamaze classes
together and each prepared a will and power of attorney naming the other
as the beneficiary. 114 V.C. was present in the delivery room when the
twins were born.11 5 M.J.B. consulted V.C. about major parenting deci-
sions, including the choice of pediatricians and day care centers. 1" 6 V.C.
was held out to be the twins' "other mother."' 17 In 1995, the couple pur-
chased a home together and participated in a commitment ceremony at
which they and the twins were blessed as a family. 118 In August 1996, the
that is parental in nature. In short, we agree ... that V.C. is the psycho-
logical parent to the twins.
Id.
111. See id. at 542 (recounting history of relationship between V.C. and M.J.B.
and how they functioned as family unit). V.C. and M.J.B. "met in 1992 and began
dating on July 4, 1993." See id. (detailing beginning of V.C. and M.J.B's
relationship).
112. See id. (discussing M.J.B.'s medical treatments). According to M.J.B., she
had been planning to be artificially inseminated since 1980 and had made the
decision to become artificially inseminated before beginning a relationship with
V.C. See id. (describing M.J.B.'s testimony regarding her intent to bear children).
M.J.B. began seeing a fertility specialist five days after she and V.C. began dating.
See id. (providing timing of M.J.B.'s fertility appointments). In preparation for her
fertility appointment, she recorded her body temperature for eight to nine months
to track her ovulation schedule. See id. (reporting steps M.J.B. took before fertility
specialist appointment). According to V.C., she and M.J.B. began discussing hav-
ing children in the beginning of their relationship. See id. (stating V.C.'s account
of decision to have children). V.C. "6laimed that she and M.J.B. jointly decided to
have children although she did not learn that M.J.B. had been seeing a fertility
specialist until two months had passed. See id. (same). M.J.B. acknowledged that
she consulted V.C. about the choice of sperm donor but made the final decision
on her own. See id. (indicating M.J.B.'s decision process regarding sperm donor).
113. See id. (noting that M.J.B. learned she was pregnant with twins in Febru-
ary 1994).
114. See id. (reporting steps taken by V.C. and M.J.B. in preparation for twins'
birth).
115. See id. (stating that V.C. took M.J.B. to hospital and was in delivery room
at time of birth).
116. See id. at 543 (discussing substantive decisions M.J.B. and V.C. made for
children).
117. See id. (finding that V.C. was listed as "other mother" on children's pedia-
trician and day care forms). V.C. and M.J.B. decided that they would have the
children call M.J.B "Mommy" and V.C. "Meema." See id. at 542-43 (noting that
M.J.B. "conceded that she referred to V.C. as a 'mother' of the children"). M.J.B.
and the children sent V.C. cards and letters that referred to V.C. as the twins'
mother. See id. (finding that M.J.B. treated V.C. as co-parent).
118. See id. (describing how M.J.B., V.C. and children lived as one family). In
mid-1995, V.C. asked M.J.B. to marry her. See id. (detailing V.C. and M.J.B.'s rela-
tionship subsequent to birth of twins). M.J.B. accepted, and the couple "married"
in a commitment ceremony. See id. (stating that couple was "married"). Subse-
quently, V.C. and M.J.B. discussed having the children's last name changed to a
hyphenated combination of V.C.'s and M.J.B.'s last names. See id. at 544 (noting
[Vol. 49: p. 363
18
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss2/4
2004] NOTE
relationship dissolved, and V.C. and M.J.B. took turns living in their home
with the children. 1 9 V.C. permanently left the family home later that year
but continued to see the children every other weekend. 120 In May 1997,
M.J.B. unilaterally cut off V.C.'s contact with the children, forcing V.C. to
turn to the courts to maintain a relationship with her children. 12 1
The court in V.C. found that V.C. met all four prongs of the test for
psychological parenthood and, thus, was the children's psychological par-
ent. 122 The court noted that because V.C. was the psychological parent,
she stood in parity with M.J.B. and, therefore, custody of the children
couple went as far as consulting an attorney about V.C. adopting the children but
never proceeded with adoption).
119. See id. (describing M.J.B.'s and V.C.'s living situations after the dissolu-
tion of their relationship). Between the dissolution of the relationship in August
and November 1996, V.C. and M.J.B. took turns living in the familial home with
the children. See id. (explaining that both parents provided care to the children
after dissolution of relationship).
120. See id. (summarizing V.C.'s visitation schedule with children after dissolu-
tion of her relationship with M.J.B. and subsequent leaving of their home).
121. See id. (stating that after M.J.B. terminated visitation, V.C. initiated cus-
tody proceeding). Immediately prior to M.J.B.'s refusal to continue the visitation
schedule, M.J.B. took a business trip and left the twins with V.C. for two weeks. See
id. (discussing events leading up to M.J.B.'s termination of visitation schedule).
After M.J.B. returned from her business trip, she refused to permit V.C. to visit
with the children and stopped accepting money from V.C. for the care of the chil-
dren. See id. (recounting reasons for refusal of visitation). M.J.B. claimed that she
did not want V.C. visiting the children because she did not believe that V.C. was
properly caring for the children and that the children were "suffering distress from
continued contact with V.C." Id.
122. See id. (holding that V.C. was psychological parent of children). In de-
ciding whether V.C. met the four-pronged test for psychological parenthood, the
court carefully scrutinized the facts of the case. See id. at 552-53 (discussing circum-
stances of V.C. and M.J.B.'s family). The court paid close attention to the first
prong, or the requirement that a legal parent consent to, and foster, the co-par-
ent's relationship with the child. See id. at 551-52 (analyzing first prong of psycho-
logical parent test). The court stated that the first prong is "critical because it
makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the psycho-
logical parent's relationship with the child." Id. at 552. Without the requirement
that the legal parent consent to or foster the relationship, a "paid nanny or babysit-
ter could . . .qualify for parental status." Id. (finding that fostering relationship
means that legal parent ceded to co-parent some measure of parental authority
and autonomy not otherwise granted to co-parent). Further, this requirement of
participation by the legal parent places the control with the legal parent. See id.
(explaining that legal parent can maintain parental "zone of privacy" by not invit-
ing third party to function as parent and by not ceding any parental authority or
autonomy). Once a legal parent has allowed the co-parent to form a relationship
with the child, the legal parent may not unilaterally terminate that relationship
when the relationship between the parents dissolves. See id. (indicating that even
when relationship between parents ends, emotional bond between co-parent and
child continues). While the court carefully scrutinized the first prong, it noted
that the fourth prong was the most important determination for courts to make.
See id. at 553 (finding that fourth prong is most important because it requires that
parent-child bond exist between co-parent and child). When courts analyze the
fourth prong, they must determine the "actuality and strength of the parent-child
bond" through expert testimony. Id.
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would be decided using the best interest standard. 123 The court then per-
formed the best interest analysis and found that it was in the children's
best interest to have a continued relationship with V.C. 1 24 The court,
however, denied V.C.'s petition for legal custody of the children. 125 In
denying V.C.'s petition for legal custody, the court noted that, due to the
pendency of the case, V.C. had not been making decisions for the twins
for four years and it would be too disruptive 'to the children to interject
her into that capacity at such a late date.1 26
The court in V.C. stated that the biological or adoptive parent's status
as a legal parent is a factor in the best interest analysis because a child's
interests in the child's roots will eventually emerge. 12 7 Thus, there is no
actual parity between the co-parent and legal parent.' 28 Even though the
legal parent and the co-parent, who has been deemed the psychological
parent, are both entitled to be considered under the best interest analysis,
the legal parent still has an advantage because legal parenthood is a "sig-
nificant" consideration. 12 9
2. In Loco Parentis
The phrase in loco parentis literally means "in the place of the par-
ent. 1 30 A person who stands in loco parentis is in a parental situation by
virtue of assuming the obligations incident to parentage. 131 To prove in
loco parentis status, a co-parent must (1) assume the status of the parent;
and (2) discharge parental duties. 13 2 An individual cannot, however, as-
123. See id. at 554-55 (examining practical effects of psychological parenthood
on custody determination). The court stated, "Once a third party has been deter-
mined to be a psychological parent to a child.., he or she stands in parity with the
legal parent. Custody and visitation issues between them are to be determined on
a best-interests standard." Id. at 554.
124. See id. (analyzing best interest of children).
125. See id. (finding that V.C. was not entitled to legal custody of children).
126. See id. (discussing rationale of court for denying V.C. legal custody of
children).
127. See id. (stating that "legal parent's status is a significant weight in the best
interests balance because eventually, in the search for self-knowledge, the child's
interest in his or her roots will emerge").
128. See Robson, supra note 29, at 29 (arguing that legal parents have signifi-
cant advantage in custody disputes due to their legal status). In theory, once a co-
parent is adjudicated to be a psychological parent, the co-parent is entitled to be
considered equal with the legal parent under the best interest analysis. See id. (dis-
cussing effect of adjudication as psychological parent). Nevertheless, this "parity is
undermined by the court's acknowledgement that a person's status as a legal par-
ent 'plays a part' in the custody or visitation proceedings." Id.
129. See id. (describing effect of biology on best interest determination).
130. BLACK's LAw DicTIONARY 791 (7th ed. 1999).
131. SeeT.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. 2001) ("'[ln locoparentis' refers
to a person who puts oneself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the for-
mality of a legal adoption.").
132. See id. at 917 (explaining that in loco parentis embodies two ideas). The
ability of the co-parent to marry the legal parent and the ability of the co-parent to
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sume in loco parentis status against the wishes of the child's legal parent.
133
Thus, there is also a requirement that the legal parent consent to a parent-
like relationship between the co-parent and the child.
13 4
As a basis for standing, in loco parentis balances the need to guard the
family against intrusions from third parties and protect the constitutional
rights of the parent with the need to protect the best interest of the
child. 135 Courts presume that it is in the child's best interest to maintain
familial privacy and autonomy. 1 36 That presumption may be rebutted
when the child has established a strong, parent-like relationship with a co-
parent. 13 7 When the child and co-parent have formed such a bond, it is in
the child's best interest to grant the co-parent standing in order to allow
the co-parent to litigate whether a continued relationship with the co-par-
ent would be in the best interest of the child.1
3 8
In T.B. v. L.R.M.,' 9 T.B. and L.R.M. entered into a committed les-
bian relationship and began living together. 140 The couple wanted a child
and decided that L.R.M. would be artificially inseminated. 4 1 The parties
jointly prepared for the birth of their child and T.B. was in the delivery
room when the baby was born. 14 2 After the birth of the baby, the three
lived as a family and took legal steps to recognize their bond.143 Through-
adopt the child are of no legal significance in determining in loco parentis status.
See id. at 919-20 (providing elements relevant to determination of in loco parentis
status).
133. See id. at 917 (recognizing that third party cannot place itself in locoparen-
tis to child "in defiance of the legal parent's" wishes).
134. See id. at 920 (stating requirement of legal parent's consent).
135. See id. at 917 ("The in loco parentis basis for standing recognizes that the
need to guard the family from intrusions by third parties and to protect the rights
of the natural parent must be tempered by the paramount need to protect the
child's best interest.").
136. See id. (noting judicial presumption).
137. See id. (describing rebuttable presumption). When a child has estab-
lished a strong psychological bond with a co-parent who, although not biologically
related to the child, has "lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affec-
tion, assuming in the child's eye a stature like that of a parent," the presumption
that a co-parent should not be allowed standing is rebutted. See id. (asserting that
best interest of child may be served by allowing co-parent standing).
138. See id. (approving of allowing co-parent standing to litigate visitation
issues).
139. 753 A.2d 873, 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
140. See id. (describing couple's relationship). T.B. and L.R.M. began a rela-
tionship in the late 1980s, moved in together in 1990 and soon thereafter pur-
chased a home together. See id. (discussing circumstances of L.R.M. and T.B.'s
relationship).
141. See id. (indicating couple's decision to start family).
142. See id. (noting events surrounding L.R.M.'s pregnancy). L.R.M. became
pregnant in late 1992 and the couple began attending Lamaze classes. See id. (dis-
cussing L.R.M.'s pregnancy).
143. See id. (finding that L.R.M. executed will naming T.B. as guardian of
child). The couple did not execute a co-parenting agreement because L.R.M. told
T.B. that one was not necessary. See id. (explaining absence of co-parent
agreement).
2004] NOTE
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out the three years the family lived together, T.B. took on many of the
parenting responsibilities. 144 When their child was three years old, the
couple began having difficulties, and T.B. moved out of the family
home. 14 5 T.B. was permitted to see her child only one time after she and
L.R.M. separated. 146 Thereafter, L.R.M. refused all of T.B.'s visitation re-
quests, phone calls and gifts for the child.1 47
T.B. filed a complaint for shared legal custody and partial physical
custody of her daughter. 1 48 At their custody hearing, L.R.M. argued that
T.B. did not have standing to bring such an action. 149 The hearing of-
ficer, however, found that T.B. did have standing to bring a custody suit
under the in loco parentis doctrine and that she should be granted reasona-
ble visitation rights. 150 L.R.M. appealed the hearing officer's findings, but
the trial court affirmed. 15 1 The court reasoned that standing principles
must evolve with the changing structure of the family:
In today's society, where increased mobility, changes in social
mores and increased individual freedom have created a wide
spectrum of arrangements filling the role of the traditional nu-
clear family, flexibility in the application of standing principles is
required in order to adapt those principles to the interests of
each particular child.' 52
While in loco parentis can allow co-parents standing to get to the best
interest analysis, it does not give the co-parent any further assistance in the
litigation. 1 53 Put differently, the in loco parentis doctrine does not give co-
144. See id. (finding that although T.B. deferred to L.R.M. regarding parental
decisions, T.B. often provided care for child and took on responsibility of medical
care and other appointments).
145. See id. at 878 (finding that T.B. left family home to have affair and subse-
quently returned). The couple's relationship was so strained thereafter that T.B.
left the home. See id. (describing dissolution of relationship).
146. See id. (discussing relationship between T.B. and her child after dissolu-
tion of relationship).
147. See id. (detailing action L.R.M. took to exclude T.B. from seeing her
child).
148. See id. (stating that on October 3, 1996, T.B. filed for shared legal cus-
tody and visitation).
149. See id. (noting that on December 9, 1996, L.R.M. filed objections to
T.B.'s complaint and asserted that T.B. lacked standing to pursue custody claim).
150. See id. (recounting findings of hearing officer).
151. See id. at 879 (accepting hearing officer's findings).
152. Id. at 884. The court found it important that T.B. lived with the child
and took on parenting duties with the consent of L.R.M. See id. (ruling that T.B.
met requirements of in loco parentis analysis).
153. SeeJ.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (declaring
in loco parentis status allows co-parents standing to reach best interest analysis, but it
does not put co-parent in parity with legal parent in best interest analysis). A per-
son with in loco parentis status remains a third party for the purposes of evaluation
under the best interest analysis. See id. (describing effect of in loco parentis status on
custody determination).
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parents the parity that the best interest standard provides psychological
parents.1 54 Rather, in the best interest of the child analysis, the co-parent
who stands in loco parentis is still a third party in the custody determination
and must shoulder an onerous evidentiary burden. 15 5
Psychological/de facto parenthood and in loco parentis theories have
given lesbian co-parents a better chance of maintaining a relationship with
their children. 156 The victory for lesbian co-parents in establishing stand-
ing through psychological/de facto parenthood and in loco parentis is un-
dermined by their continued inferior legal status compared to the
biological or adoptive parent of the child.1 57 Psychological/de facto
parenthood is the better definitional mechanism for co-parents because it
places them, at least in theory, in parity with the co-parent for purposes of
the best interest of the child determination. 158
B. Statutory Solutions
Statutory proposals offer an analytical framework for legislatures to
afford lesbian co-parents legal relationships with their children.1 59 Legisla-
tures can adopt these statutory schemes and ensure uniform adjudication
of parentage.1 60 Two statutory proposals are the Uniform Parentage
154. Compare id. at 1322 (stating that co-parent with in loco parentis status is still
third party in best interest analysis), with V.C. v. M.J.B, 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J.
2000) (stating that once co-parent is psychological parent co-parent stands in par-
ity with legal parent). For a further discussion of psychological parenthood, see
supra notes 104-29 and accompanying text.
155. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 919 n.8 (Pa. 2001) ("[W]here the cus-
tody dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, the burden of proof
is not evenly balanced and that the evidentiary scale is tipped hard to the biologi-
cal parent's side.").
156. Compare VC., 748 A.2d at 554 (ruling that once co-parent is psychologi-
cal parent of child, co-parent is entitled to visitation determination under best
interest analysis), and Holtzmann v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (hold-
ing that psychological parent was entitled to custody determination under best
interest analysis), and T.B., 786 A.2d at 917 (finding best interest of child may be
served by allowing co-parent who stands in loco parentis to have standing for pur-
poses of visitation determination), with Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 109-
10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that psychological parents are not entitled to
visitation determination), and Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 683 (Vt. 1997)
(refusing to allow co-parent standing to adjudicate visitation dispute).
157. For a discussion of the continuing inferior status of co-parents, see supra
notes 127-29, 153-55 and accompanying text.
158. See VC., 748 A.2d at 554-55 ("Once a third party has been determined to
be a psychological parent to a child .... he or she stands in parity with the legal
parent. Custody and visitation issues between them are to be determined on a
best-interests standard .... ").
159. SeeJacobs, supra note 22, at 351-52 (recommending statutory framework
that authorizes co-parents to be treated as parents). Statutory proposals that use a
parental analytic framework should allow the co-parent to "obtain a legal declara-
tion[ ] of parentage." Id. at 352 (describing effect of parental analytic framework).
160. For a discussion of statutory solutions to adjudicate parentage for lesbian
co-parents, see infra notes 161-201 and accompanying text.
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Act 16 1 and Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. 162 These statutory
solutions to the problem of adjudicating parentage for lesbian co-parents
offer legislatures a well-considered statutory scheme that will ensure uni-
form adjudication of parentage. 163
1. Uniform Parentage Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act in 1973 to address the status of
non-marital children. 1 64 The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) was last
amended and revised in 2002 in an attempt to "modernize[ I] the law for
determining the parents of children." 165 Currently, four states have
adopted the UPA. 1
66
Scholars have advocated the UPA as a mechanism for courts to adjudi-
cate child custody matters when a lesbian co-parent is involved. 1 67 The
UPA allows for non-biological fathers to obtain parenting rights and can
easily be adapted to do the same for non-biological mothers.1 68 Using the
UPA as a framework for adjudicating maternity would allow courts to place
lesbian co-parents in the same position as legal parents and give the chil-
dren the benefits of having a second legal parent.
1 69
161. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002), available at http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bIl/ulc/upa/final2002.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2003) (noting
proposed child custody statutes). For a further discussion of the Uniform Parent-
age Act (UPA), see infra notes 161-81.
162. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION (2002) [here-
inafter PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION] (describing proposed child custody
statutes). For a further discussion of the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion, see infra notes 182-201.
163. SeeJacobs, supra note 22, at 354 (concluding that statutory schemes that
involve parental analytic framework for co-parents "offer[ ] the most reliable
method for legalizing a full parental relationship for lesbian coparents with their
children").
164. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (stating that Uniform Parentage
Act was "[t]he most important act addressing the status of the non-marital
child .... ). The UPA (1973) was fully adopted in nineteen states and partially
adopted in many other states. See id. (discussing adoption of UPA (1973)).
Among states that have adopted the UPA (1973), however, case law has not
"reached consistent results." See id. (indicating legal disparities among states that
have adopted UPA (1973)).
165. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Parent-
age Act: Summary, at http://www.nccusl.org/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2004) (describing
goal of UPA).
166. See id. at Legislative Fact Sheet (stating that Delaware, Texas, Washington
and Wyoming have enacted UPA (2002)).
167. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 22, at 369 (arguing that UPA can be applied
to "establish two legal parents of the same sex").
168. See id. at 377 ("Lesbian co-parents should be able to obtain parentage
adjudications under the UPAjust as non-biological fathers can and do.").
169. See id. at 344 (asserting that adjudicating maternity under UPA will
"legaliz[e] a full parental relationship for lesbian co-parents with their children").
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The adjudication of maternity through the UPA can be accomplished
under its maternity provision.1 7° Section 106 ("Determination of Mater-
nity") of the UPA provides that "[p]rovisions of this Act relating to deter-
mination of paternity apply to determinations of maternity."' 7 1 Section
601 is used in conjunction with section 602 ("Standing to Maintain Pro-
ceeding"), which states that "a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be
maintained by... a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated";
together, these sections allow a lesbian co-parent to petition the court to
adjudicate her maternity.1 72
Once a lesbian co-parent's maternity is adjudicated, she is the child's
mother in the eyes of the law. 173 This allows the co-parent to stand in
parity with the biological parent of the child during the best interest deter-
mination. 174 Further, unlike the definitional theories above that are only
utilized in custody litigation, the UPA can be useful in resolving maternity
when the family is still intact. 17 5
While the UPA seems to be a reliable method of legalizing the full
parental relationship between co-parents and their children, some difficul-
ties still exist. 17 6 First, under the UPA framework, co-parents still have to
go through a bifurcated analysis when they file a custody suit against their
170. See id. at 377 (concluding that UPA maternity provision provides statu-
tory basis for adjudicating co-parents as mothers).
171. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 106; see also id. § 106 cmt. ("This section provides
for a determination of the mother-child relationship if that issue is in dispute.").
172. Id. § 602 (authorizing legal proceeding to be maintained to adjudicate
parentage by certain persons). Section 602 provides that:
(A] proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
(1) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support enforcement agency [or other governmental agency au-
thorized by other law];
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child placing agency; [or]
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would
otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, inca-
pacitated, or a minor [; or
(7) an intended parent under [Article] 8].
Id. (alterations in original). Lesbian co-parents can use clause three to adjudicate
their maternity because section 106 states that provisions that apply to paternity
also apply to maternity. See id. § 106 (declaring that provisions of UPA that apply
to determinations of paternity also apply to determinations of maternity).
173. SeeJacobs, supra note 22, at 389 (arguing that UPA enables lesbian co-
parent to fully resolve her legal parent status).
174. See id. at 389-90 (indicating that UPA establishes parity between lesbian
co-parent and biological mother).
175. See id. at 353 (stating that complaints do not need to flow from adver-
sarial proceedings). Co-parents are able to file for adjudication of maternity with-
out having to sue their lesbian partner for custody rights. See id. (noting that
parties can file written voluntary acknowledgement with court in lieu of filing
complaint).
176. See id. at 389 (recognizing that UPA offers consistent method for adjudi-
cating maternal status of co-parents).
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partners. 17 7 A co-parent who brings a suit to adjudicate maternity when
she is in an adversarial relationship with her former partner must first be
found by the court to be the child's parent; the court must then decide
custody using the best interest standard. 178 Second, there is still the ques-
tion of whether, in practice, lesbian co-parents who are adjudicated par-
ents will actually be treated as equal mothers with the biological
parents.1 79 Specifically, when it is time to do the best interest analysis,
there is a question of whether the parity between the biological parent and
the co-parent is an actuality or a meaningless designation. °8 0 Third, adju-
dicating maternity will be costly for the co-parent, both emotionally and
financially. 181
2. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion offer another statutory alternative for states to ensure that co-parents
are recognized as legal parents of their children. 18 2 The American Law
Institute (ALl) proffered its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
("ALl Principles") in 2000 to offer a "legal framework that can accommo-
date the different choices people make and the different expectations
they bring to their family relationships."' 83 The legal framework recog-
nizes both the value systems in which traditional families are formed as
well as the realities of non-traditional families. 184 The ALI Principles can
be used to adjudicate maternity because they define parent through both
parent by estoppel and de facto parentage. 185
177. SeeJacobs, supra note 22, at 390 (noting that once co-parent is adjudi-
cated parent, court proceeds to best interest analysis).
178. See id. (explaining that co-parent must go through two-step process in
parentage and custody determination).
179. See id. at 389-90 (indicating that UPA establishes parity between lesbian
co-parent and biological mother). But see Robson, supra note 29, at 29 (asserting
that legal parents have significant advantage in custody disputes due to their legal
status). "This parity is undermined by the court's acknowledgement that a per-
son's status as a legal parent 'plays a part' in the custody or visitation proceedings."
Id.
180. See Robson, supra note 29, at 29 (arguing that "parity" between co-parent
and biological parent is not actual equality).
181. See Polikoff, supra note 18, at 526 (recognizing reluctance of lesbian
couples to enter legal system). Although they may want to solidify their relation-
ship with their children, lesbian couples may be reluctant to enter the legal system
because of societal bias against homosexuals. See id. (asserting that homophobia
deters lesbians from entering legal system). Furthermore, parentage actions cost
approximately $1,500. See id. (discussing litigation costs).
182. See PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 162, at xv (noting, in
"Director's Forward," that purpose of principles is to provide guidance to legisla-
tures and courts).
183. Id. (discussing purposes of principles).
184. See id. ("[T]he principles are sensitive to both the traditional value sys-
tems within which most families are formed and the nontraditional realities and
expectations of other families.").
185. See id. § 2.03 (defining parent by estoppel and de facto parent).
388 [Vol. 49: p. 363
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a. Parent by Estoppel
According to the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is one who, al-
though not a biological or adoptive parent:
[L]ived with the child since the child's birth, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibility as a parent, as part of
a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent...
to raise a child together each with full parental rights and re-
sponsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the indi-
vidual as a parent is in the child's best interests; or
[L]ived with the child for at least two years, holding out and ac-
cepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant
to an agreement with the child's parent... , when the court finds
that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's best
interests., 86
Once a co-parent meets these circumstantial requirements of parent by
estoppel, the co-parent has the rights and privileges of a legal parent, in-
cluding standing to bring an action for custody.
18 7
In a custody action brought by a co-parent who has been adjudicated
a parent by estoppel, the co-parent is granted a presumption of custodial
time, joint allocation of decision making, right of access to school and
health records and priority over de facto and non-parents in the allocation
of custody.1 88 Thus, co-parents who are able to meet the standard of
parenthood by estoppel truly stand in parity with legal parents. 189 Al-
though the co-parent must go through the parentage adjudication, once
the determination of parenthood by estoppel has been made, the co-par-
186. Id. § 2.03(1)(b). Parent by estoppel is also defined in this section as:
[A] n individual who, though not a legal parent,
(i) is obligated to pay child support... ; or
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and
(A) over that period of time had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he
was the child's biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on
the actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental
responsibilities consistent with that belief, and
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to
make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the
child's father ....
Id. Because this definition relies on the good-faith belief of biological parenthood,
it does not assist a lesbian co-parent in her adjudication of parenthood. See id.
(requiring individual to have good-faith belief that he was child's biological
father).
187. See id. § 2.03 cmt. b ("A parent by estoppel is afforded all of the privileges
of a legal parent... including standing to bring an action and the right to have
notice of and participate in an action brought by another ...."); see also id. § 2.04
(naming parties that are granted standing to petition for parental rights).
188. See id. § 2.03 cmt. b (discussing rights and privileges of parents by
estoppel).
189. See id. (authorizing parent by estoppel to be afforded all privileges of
legal parent).
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ent is statutorily entitled to the presumption of physical and legal
custody. ' 90
b. De Facto Parenthood
In contrast to equitable parenthood, the ALI Principles define de
facto parent as an individual who lived with the child for more than two
years and, with the agreement of the legal parent, formed a parent-child
relationship for reasons other than financial compensation.19 1 A de facto
parent is further required to have a caretaking role in relation to the
child. 192 To meet the definition of de facto parent, a parent must have
performed either a majority of caretaking functions for the child or, alter-
natively, must have regularly performed a share of the caretaking func-
tions for the child equal to that of the legal parent. 9
Once a co-parent is adjudicated a de facto parent, the co-parent only
has standing to bring a suit for custody of the child if the co-parent has
resided with the child for the six-month period prior to the filing of the
suit or has consistently maintained or tried to maintain the parental rela-
tionship since last residing with the child. 19 4 The temporal requirement is
designed to take into account the increasingly attenuated relationship that
occurs as the functional parent-child relationship becomes more remote
in time. 19 5 The time period is waived when the legal parent prevents the
190. For further discussion of the rights of parents by estoppel, see supra
notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
191. See id. §2.03(1)(c) (defining de facto parent). Section 2.03(1)(c)
provides:
A defacto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by
estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a
result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the
child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great
as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
Id.
192. See id. § 2.03(1) (c) (ii) (A), (B) (requiring caretaking role by de facto
parents).
193. See id. (stating that de facto parents must have regularly performed care-
taking functions for child).
194. See id. § 2.04 (1) (c) (providing that to bring custody suit "a de facto par-
ent of the child.... [must have] resided with the child within the six-month period
prior to the filing of the action or who.has consistently maintained or attempted to
maintain the parental relationship since residing with the child").
195. See id. § 2.04 cmt. d (noting that when functional relationship becomes
more remote in time, it becomes less reasonable to recognize parental status based
on that relationship). The six-month period is important because, as a determi-
nate time period, it allows de facto parents to know their status with respect to
their parental rights to their children. See id. (commenting on six-month require-
ment). Further, the six-month period is an appropriate amount of time "in terms
[Vol. 49: p. 363
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co-parent from maintaining a relationship with the children; this waiver
attempts to "eliminate the advantages of uncooperative or strategic behav-
ior" on the part of the legal parent.l9 6 If a co-parent can overcome these
circumstantial and temporal requirements, the co-parent is entitled to an
allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibility, but not more
responsibility than that of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel. 19 7
The ALI Principles make definite distinctions between legal parents,
parents by estoppel and de facto parents.198 Under the ALI Principles,
parents by estoppel and legal parents stand in actual parity. I99 The pur-
pose of these distinctions, and the preference given to legal parents and
parents by estoppel, is to "reflect the societal consensus that responsibility
for children ordinarily should be retained by a child's parents, while rec-
ognizing that there are some exceptional circumstances in which the
child's needs are best served by continuity of care by other adults."20 0
Parenthood by estoppel offers co-parents true parity with legal parents,
and this makes parenthood by estoppel the best way for co-parents to le-
galize their relationships with their children. 20 ' Yet, one obvious draw-
back to adjudication of parentage under the ALI Principles is that this
option is only available to co-parents after their relationships dissolve and
does not offer a way to preemptively establish a legal relationship between
co-parent and child.
V. CONCLUSION
Lesbians who actively participate in the parentage of children in the
context of a committed lesbian relationship should be adjudicated parents
of the children. 20 2 Lesbian parents can protect their families by forming a
legal bond between co-parent and child from conception with a pre-birth
of the child's interest in continuity." See id. (indicating desirability of fixed time
period).
196. Id. (acknowledging waiver of six-month period when legal parent blocks
de facto parent's attempts to maintain relationship with child).
197. See id. § 2.18 cmt. b (asserting that legal parents and parents by estoppel
are given priority over de facto parents).
198. See id. § 2.03 (defining legal parent, parent by estoppel and de facto par-
ent); id. § 2.08 (discussing proper allocation of custodial responsibility between
legal parents, parents by estoppel and de facto parents); id. § 2.18 (declaring allo-
cation of custodial responsibility to de facto parents).
199. See id. § 2.08 (finding that legal parents and parents by estoppel are enti-
tled to custody determination); id. § 2.18 cmt. b (authorizing parents by estoppel
and legal parents to be given priority over de facto parents).
200. Id. § 2.18 cmt. a.
201. For a discussion of parenthood by estoppel, see supra notes 186-89 and
accompanying text.
202. For a discussion of the rationale for adjudicating co-parents as legal par-
ents, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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decree or through second-parent adoption.20 3 Where these options are
unattractive or unavailable to families, the co-parents should be able to
utilize the justice system. Legislatures can ensure that co-parents and chil-
dren receive the legal protections they need and deserve by adopting stat-
utory schemes like the UPA or ALI Principles. 20 4 These legal frameworks
allow co-parents to be adjudicated parents of their children. 20 5 Under the
ALI Principles, co-parents stand in true parity with legal parents and are
given a presumptive guarantee of custodial power. 20 6 Importantly, under
the UPA, adjudication of parentage can be realized for an intact lesbian
family. 20 7 If legislatures do not affirmatively act to install statutory parent-
age schemes, courts should use a broader definition of parent when inter-
preting statutes. 20 8 Courts should use the psychological parent/de facto
parent definition because after the co-parent passes the stringent, fact-
based test, the co-parent should stand in parity with the legal parent under
the best interest analysis. 20 9 The reality of modern families is that they do
not fit the "nuclear" model. 210 To protect children in these non-tradi-
tional families, states must begin to adjudicate their co-parents as legal
parents. 2
11
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203. For a discussion of pre-birth decrees, see supra notes 56-60 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of second parent adoption, see supra notes 35-47 and
accompanying text.
204. For a discussion of the UPA or ALl Principles as statutory proposals to
adjudicate parentage and resolve legal needs of co-parents and their children, see
supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
205. For a discussion of adjudicating parentage under the UPA and ALl Prin-
ciples, see supra notes 159-201 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the benefits of parentage as adjudicated through the
ALI Principles, see supra notes 182-85, 198-200 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of the benefit of utilizing the UPA to adjudicate parent-
age while the relationship is still intact, see supra notes 173-75 and accompanying
text.
208. For a discussion of the benefits and limitations of broader definitional
schemes of parenthood, see supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the benefits of psychological/de facto parenthood as
opposed to other definitional theories, see supra note 158 and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the structure of modern non-traditional families, see
supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
211. For a discussion of the benefits of recognizing co-parents as legal par-
ents, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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